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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 980258-CA 
vs. : 
TODD SHONTEL WEST, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of child abuse, a third degree felony, in violation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(2)(b) (1995), in the Fifth District Court, Iron County, 
the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Is defendant's sufficiency claim properly before this Court where (1) it 
is unsupported by any citations to the record; and (2) the evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict is not marshaled? 
Since this claim is properly determined without reference to any action below, 
no standard of review applies. 
2. May defendant challenge his Miranda warnings and his waiver of counsel 
without citation to the relevant portions of the record or to relevant authority? 
Since this claim is properly determined without reference to any action below, 
no standard of review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of the following provision is relevant to the appeal: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(2)(B) (1995). 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, 
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict 
serious physical injury upou a child is guilty of an offense as follows: 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Information dated 23 April 1997 with child abuse, a 
third-degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(2)(b) (1995) (R. 1-2). 
Sarah GrandBois was similarly charged and the cases consolidated for trial (R. 104-08, 
135-36, see alsoR. 244:7). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress "all evidence obtained and derived from that 
interview on about April 25, 1997, between then Detective Kenneth Stapley and Defendant 
Todd West" on the ground that defendant "at that point had an absolute right to counsel, 
without having to make such a request, he was not provided with counsel and he did 
2 
not effectively waive his right to counsel prior to the interrogation" (R. 140). The trial 
court denied this motion at trial (R. 244: 88-91). 
The jury found defendant guilty as charged (R. 211).1 Defendant was sentenced 
to a statutory term of imprisonment; no fine was imposed (R. 223). Defendant timely 
appealed (R. 228). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
The incident Marquel GrandBois was bom to Sarah GrandBois on 5 April 1996 
(R. 244: 34-35). About a month later defendant moved into Sarah's apartment; later 
defendant's mother also moved in (R. 244: 35-36). Although Marquel was eight months 
old in December, she still crawled; she was not able to stand up and walk around holding 
on to a coffee table (R. 244: 37). 
On the morning of 4 December 1996, defendant, Sarah, and Marquel were home 
(R. 245: 230-31). Defendant was working on his car (R. 244: 101). It was a cold day, 
and he would occasionally come inside to warm up, check on Marquel, grab a cigarette, 
or use the bathroom (R. 244: 101; 245: 228). Marquel was there the whole day, crawling 
around on the floor (R. 244: 101-02). 
1
 Sarah GrandBois was convicted of negligent child abuse, a class A misdemeanor (R. 
245: 343). 
2
 Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (Utah 1993). 
3 
Defendant told police that on the morning in question "he would go in and lay 
the child back down in the crib when the child would get up from the . . . nap and stand 
on the side of the crib" (R. 245: 229). He had several ways of laying the child down: 
"Sometimes he'd grab the child by the midsection and place the child down. Other times 
he'd grab the child by the feet and pull the feet from out from underneath the child forcing 
the baby to fall to the mattress" (R. 245: 229). 
Sarah told a social worker that she noticed the injury at about 11:30 a.m. (R. 244: 
60). A friend, Kelly Francis Flynn, picked Marquel up and noticed that her leg "was 
just kind of hanging there" and that Marquel was crying (R. 245: 287). She persuaded 
Sarah to take Marquel to the hospital (R. 245: 289). That night at 10:15 p.m. Sarah took 
Marquel into the emergency room with a broken leg (R. 244: 45). She told the doctor 
that Marquel had stopped pulling herself up into a standing position (R. 244: 154). 
Defendant stated "that there was a possibility that . . . he could have caused the 
injury but he didn't remember doing any excessive force" (R. 245: 230). However, Sarah 
and defendant had no explanation at the time as to how Marquel had suffered a broken 
leg (R. 244: 59, 61, 100, 112).3 The child had in fact suffered two breaks (R. 244: 145-50). 
3
 Four days after the incident, defendant and his mother claimed that Sarah had stepped 
on the child the night before at a party in the home (R. 244:102-03; 106). However, if force 
were applied from the side of the leg, such as someone stepping on the leg, a transverse, not 
spiral, fracture would normally result (R. 244: 154-55). Moreover, it would be unusual for 
a child to suffer such an injury in the evening—as defendant and his mother suggested—and 
show no symptoms until late the next morning (R. 244: 157-58). 
4 
The injuries- An x-ray showed an "oblique" or "spiral" fracture of the left tibia, 
the bone between the knee and ankle (R. 244: 145, 147). A spiral fracture results from 
a twisting injury (R. 244: 147). The injury is "quite unusual" in a child of this age (R. 
244: 147-48). 
According to the treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. McNaught, this injury "involves 
a moderate degree of force to produce this type of fracture in an eight month old because 
their bones are fairly resilient and so it would either be a fall off something with a twisting 
of the leg or a forcible twist of the leg" (R. 244: 147, 155-56). The twist would have 
to be "fairly forcible" (R. 244:, 160). Flipping a child over with excessive force could 
cause such a spiral fracture (R. 244: 167). 
The next day Dr. McNaught conducted a "skeletal survey where [he] x-rayed the 
entire body to see if there was any other signs of injury, fracture" (R. 244: 148-49). 
He found a small "buckle fracture" or indentation just about the right ankle, which he 
surmised that this fracture was two to three weeks old (R. 244: 149-50). A buckle fracture 
can result from a fall or from a direct blow (R. 244: 150). Its location was "a characteristic 
area for breaks in child abuse" (R. 244: 165). 
5 
The experts. According to Dr. McNaught, it would be "highly unusual" for a 
child who does not yet walk to accidentally self-inflict a spiral fracture or a buckle fracture 
(R. 244: 152; see also R. 244: 59, 72, 74).4 
Dr. Tim Kutz, an expert in pediatrics and child abuse and a member of the Primary 
Children's Hospital Child Protection Team, opined that Marquel "had suffered inflicted 
trauma and that it wasn't from an accident" (R. 244: 174, 177). He testified that "[t]he 
particular spiral fracture that Marquel had is commonly referred to as a toddler's fracture," 
because it is commonly suffered by children who are "learning how to walk, they walk 
fairly well but they still have an occasion to fall" (R. 244: 177). However, Marquel's 
injury differed slightly from "a classic toddler's fracture": the space between the two 
edges of the fracture indicated that more force had been applied than typically seen in 
accidental injuries, even of larger, more mobile children (R. 244: 178-79). 
Another factor contributed to Dr. Kutz's conclusion that Marquel's injuries were 
the result of child abuse. She "had a second fracture of the opposite leg that also appeared 
to be fairly new" (R. 244: 179). Thus, he saw (1) a type of fracture that was unusual 
in a pre-toddler; (2) the fracture was more severe than most toddler's fractures; and (3) 
there was an associated second fracture, all "in an eight month old child that is not up 
running around on their own accord" (R. 244: 179). 
4
 Nor would these fractures be expected to occur in the normal care of a child or from 
someone standing or stepping on the child (R. 244: 154, 158). 
6 
Dr. Kutz testified that neither the spiral fracture nor the buckle fracture would occur 
in normal handling of a child (R. 244: 180).5 Nor would these injuries be expected to 
result from a fall from a couch (R. 244: 182).6 The fact that Marquel "was noted to begin 
limping that morning and have progressive lack of use of that leg . . . would indicate 
. . . that it happened that morning" (R. 244: 183). 
Dr. Kutz testified that in his opinion, and in the unanimous opinion of the Primary 
Children Hospital's Child Protection Team, the nature of Marquel's two fractures, near 
in time, and without a reasonable explanation given at the time of presentation, placed 
them in the category of abuse injuries (R. 244: 185, 186-87). 
Jessica Brown. Jessica Brown observed defendant's interactions with Marquel. 
Brown was a friend of Sarah GrandBois and Marquel's occasional baby-sitter; she also 
had a child Marquel's age (R. 244: 117-19, 138). She observed that "when Marquel 
would come into the room and [defendant] would be in the same room, Marquel would 
freak out" (R. 244: 118-19). She would, in Brown's words, "have a total come-apart 
and wouldn't want to have anything to do with him. She was terrified of him" (R. 244: 
119). Brown continued, "to be afraid of someone when you're that little and . . . the 
5
 Furthermore, "[m]ost of the time when children are stepped on they don't fracture their 
leg" (R. 244: 180). When it does happen, the break is usually straight, not at an angle, and 
the child usually responds "by screaming, usually fairly hysterically" (R. 244: 181). 
6
 Defendant also told police that Marquel had fallen off a couch, but that she was fine 
afterward (R. 244: 109). Again, the reaction of a child who suffers such a fracture from 
falling off a couch is likely to react with pain and crying (R. 244: 157). 
7 
look of horror that she had on her face and the screaming that she would do when he 
would . . . walk near her or that she would walk in the room and he would be there was, 
was scary, really scary" (R. 244: 119). In contrast, Marquel was fine when Brown tended 
her (R. 244: 119-20). 
Brown also observed defendant spank Marquel at "a level that was in excess of 
what would be called for for a child that age" (R. 244: 127). He "would always refer 
to her as like spoiled brat [sic] and call her names and so forth . . . And he just seemed 
very frustrated and . . . it seemed like there was a hatred there" (R. 244: 127). When 
Marquel would get into things, like videotapes, defendant would "get upset with her" 
and "pull her away from it real hard like yank her arm" (R. 244: 130-31). 
Brown was willing to leave her child with Sarah and did so once after Sarah assured 
her that defendant would not be there (R. 244: 134, 139-40). However, when Brown 
arrived to pick up her daughter, the two little girls "were in the livingroom getting into 
videos and playing around and they were totally unattended" (R. 244: 120). She found 
defendant and Sarah "back in the bedroom smoking pot" (R. 244: 120, 141). 
The following day a Child and Family Services worker visited the home (R. 244: 
57). Marquel "was seated on Sarah's lap and . . . seemed to be fine. She . . . wasn't 
fussing" (R. 244: 58). However, when Sarah placed Marquel on defendant's lap, "the 
baby started to whine and cry and didn't want to sit there anymore (R. 244: 58). 
8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant's brief contains no citations to the record in support of his sufficiency 
claim. Accordingly, this claim fails for inadequate briefing. Defendant also fails to marshal 
the evidence in support of the jury verdict; hence, this Court should not reach his claim. 
2. Defendant claims that he was not properly warned of his Miranda rights because 
the interrogating detective did not speak the words distinctly. The trial court's ruling 
was based on a tape recording of the interview. Defendant has not made that audiotape 
a part of the record on appeal Accordingly, the record is inadequate to demonstrate 
the judge's finding was clearly erroneous. 
Defendant also claims that his waiver of Miranda rights was ineffective because 
he was motivated by fear bome of his arrest by four officers and unspecified pressure 
exerted by the interrogating officer. This claim fails because it is inadequately briefed. 
The factual assertions underlying the claim are unsupported by the record, and the lone 





DEFENDANT'S SUFTICIENCY CLAIM IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE 
THIS COURT BECAUSE (1) IT IS UNSUPPORTED BY ANY 
CITATIONS TO THE RECORD; AND (2) DEFENDANT HAS NOT 
MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE JURY'S VERDICT 
Defendant claims that "[t]he State did not present sufficient evidence at the trial 
on this matter to support West's conviction for Child Abuse, and the conviction should 
therefore be overturned." Br. Aplt. at 9. He claims, in fact, that "the State of Utah did 
not put on any evidence that West had been the perpetrator of the crime." Id. at 4. 
This claim fails for inadequate briefing. Neither the Statement of Facts section 
nor the Argument section of defendant's brief contains any citations to the record on 
appeal. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that the argument 
portion of appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not 
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on. " (Emphasis added.) "This court need not, and will not, consider any 
facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record." Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of 
California, 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987). 
In addition, defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence supporting the jury's 
verdict. 
10 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel 
must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume 
the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling 
the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports 
the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent 
array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in 
the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the 
appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly 
erroneous. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App.1991). Defendant's 
four-line summary of the State's evidence, without citation to the record, is not the required 
"magnificent array," nor does it "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists." Id. Defendant has therefore failed to comply with the marshaling 
requirement. 
"Failure to marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of 
insufficiency considered on appeal." State v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1189 (Utah App. 
1993) (citing State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990)). Accordingly, 
defendant's sufficiency claim is waived.7 
7
 The claim lacks merit in any event. It was undisputed at trial that defendant and 
Sarah—both of whom were convicted, though of different levels of offenses—had exclusive 
care of Marquel on the morning of 4 December, when Sarah first noticed the injury. The 
injury was of type that Marquel would not have suffered accidentally. See pp. 5-6 herein. 
Defendant even admitted "a possibility that. . . he could have caused the injury but he didn't 
remember doing any excessive force" (R. 245:230). Moreover, defendant had a history of 




DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO HIS MIRANDA WARNINGS 
AND HIS WAIVER OF COUNSEL FAILS FOR LACK OF 
SUPPORT IN THE RECORD AND RELEVANT AUTHORITY 
Defendant claims that he 'Svas denied his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel 
due to the failure of Detective Stapley to provide him with Miranda warnings that were 
sufficient under the circumstances of the interrogation." Br. Aplt. at 10. He further claims 
that his waiver of rights was ineffective because he "was operating under a significant 
degree of fear." Id. at 12. Defendant cites both federal and state constitutions. See id. 
Proceedings below. Defendant claimed below that his right to counsel was violated 
by the "hasty manner" in which Miranda warnings were given and the manner of his 
arrest—with "at least four people" and "a K-9 unit also" (R. 244: 82-85). 
At the hearing on this motion, the trial court listened to a tape recording of the 
beginning of the police interview, when Detective Stapley gave defendant his Miranda 
7(...continued) 
e.g., State v. Alien, 839 P.2d 291, 297 (Utah 1992); State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 543-48 
(Utah 1983); State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Utah App.1993). In view of the 
deferential standard of review, State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994), this evidence is sufficient to survive a sufficiency 
challenge. 
Defendant's complaints that the verdict rests on "circumstantial evidence" and that 
the jury returned a guilty verdict in the face of contrary evidence, Br. Aplt. at 9, are not well 
taken. See State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874,877 (Utah 1985) ("The existence of contradictory 
evidence or conflicting inferences does not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict"); State v. 
Watts, 675 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 1983) ("Defendant incorrectly assumes that his mere denial 
of any criminal deed and the lack of direct evidence in this case mandates our reversing his 
conviction"). 
12 
warnings (R. 244: 90-91). That audiotape is not part of the record on appeal. However, 
two transcriptions of it are in the record. 
The first, which contains the entire interrogation, is a police transcript that defendant 
submitted to the trial court in support of his motion to suppress {see R. 165). He did 









The second written version of the exchange appears in the trial transcript. At trial, 
the court reporter transcribed the portion of the tape recording played in court. Here 
is her transcription of that portion of the tape: 
13 
Todd, let me explain your rights to you. You have a right to 
remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against 
you in a court of law. You have a right to have an attorney and 
have him present with you while you are being questioned. If 
you cannot afford to hire one, one will be appointed to represent 
you before any question begins if you wish. Do you understand 
those rights? 
Yes. 
As we go through here and talk, if you want an attorney, just 
let me know. Okay? 
Yes. 
Now, with these rights in mind, do you want to answer a few 
questions that I have, and discuss our problem? 
Yes. 
(INTERVIEW TAPE PLAYED) 
MR. STAPLEY?: This is an interview with Mr. Todd West. It is the 
25th day of April, about 25 after 2:00. 
Okay. Todd, you have a right to remain silent. Anything you say can 
and will be used against you in a court of law. You have a right to have 
an attorney and have him present with you while you're being questioned. 
If you can't afford to hire one, one will be appointed to represent you before 
any questioning begins if you wish. Do you understand those rights? 
MR. WEST?: Yes. 
MR. STAPLEY?: If we go through here and talk— 
(INTERVIEW TAPE TURNED OFF) 
THE JUDGE: Let it play. I'd like to hear the— 
(INTERVIEW TAPE PLAYED) 
MR. STAPLEY?: If you want an attorney as we go through here and 
talk just let me know. Okay? 
Having these rights in mind do you want to answer a few questions 
that I've got and discuss our problem? 
MR. WEST?: (Inaudible). 
MR. STAPLEY?: All right. 
(INTERVIEW TAPE TURNED OFF) 
(R. 244: 90-91).8 
8
 The record contains no explanation for the differences in the police transcript and the 
trial transcript. Perhaps the incompleteness of the court reporter's version resulted from the 
fact that she transcribed the tape based on a single hearing, whereas the police secretary was 
(continued...) 
14 
After hearing the tape, the trial court denied the suppression motion (R. 244: 88-91). 
The court found that defendant "was told in no uncertain terms that he had the right to 
an attorney and that if he wanted to have an attorney advise him he could do that before 
he was questioned or even after questioning began" (R 244: 92). It further found, "Clearly 
[defendant] waived his right to have an attorney present before questioning or during 
questioning" (R. 244: 92). The court ruled that defendant "was given those warnings 
and exercised his free will to choose to talk to the officer without an attorney present" 
(R. 244: 92). 
True, the officer's voice slurred on occasion but in normal human 
communication the way you solve that problem is you say I didn't understand 
that, would you repeat it please? You don't go ahead and give up your right 
to [an] attorney if you didn't understand what was said. And clearly the 
part where he was told . . . that he had the right to have an attorney present 
and could get one at any time by just mentioning it was very loud and clear. 
(R. 244: 93). The trial court also "[found] that there was no coercion" (R. 244: 92). 
S;**.e constitution. Defendant nominally referred without separate analysis to 
the Utah Constitution in the trial court (R. 161-64) and does the same on appeal. See 
Br. Aplt. at 11-12. 
Our supreme court has "encouraged parties briefing state constitutional issues to 
use historical and textual evidence, sister state law, and policy arguments in the form 
of economic and sociological materials to assist us in arriving at a proper interpretation 
8(...continued) 
presumably able to listen to the tape repeatedly. 
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of the provision in question." Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 
n.6 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). "Each of these types of evidence can help in divining 
the intent and purpose of the framers, a critical aspect of any constitutional interpretation." 
Id. (citations omitted). Defendant's brief attempts no such analysis. 
This Court will "decline to undertake a state constitutional analysis" of an appellant's 
claim where he does not separately brief the state constitutional claim and "does not 
argue that the analysis of this issue under the Utah Constitution would be different from 
its analysis under the federal constitution . . . This Court will not engage in constructing 
arguments out of whole cloth . . ." State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1996) 
(quoting State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 & n. 5 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus granted 
on other grounds, Lafferty v. Cook 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir.1991), cert, denied, 504 
U.S. 911 (1992)); accord Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 519 n. 2 (Utah), cert denied, 
513 U.S. 966 (1994)). Accordingly, no state constitutional claim is before this Court. 
Sufficiency of Miranda warning. Defendant claims that his rights under Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 471 (1966) were "read in an [sic] quick, slurred manner, and Mr. 
West was unable to fully understand what his rights were with respect to having and 
[sic] attorney present." Br. Aplt. at 8. 
After listening to a tape recording of the interview, the trial court found defendant's 
Miranda warning was understandable (R. 244: 93-94). While recognizing that some 
of the detective's words were slurred, the court found that "the part where [defendant] 
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was told . . . that he had the right to have an attorney present and could get one at any 
time by just mentioning it was very loud and clear" (R. 244: 93). 
A trial court's factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress are 
reviewed for clear error. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998). A judicial 
determination that words were spoken in an understandable fashion, based upon hearing 
a tape recording of those words, is obviously such a factual finding. 
Defendant's challenge fails because he has not included the tape recording at issue 
in the record on appeal. "It is the appellant's duty to bring his appeal to [the appellate 
court] supported by ar\ adequate. ar\d proper record," absent which the appellate court 
will not reverse. State v. Thieson, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). Without 
this tape recording, defendant is unable to attack the trial court's finding. 
Defendant's claim that he is entitled to reversal based on his lack of understanding 
fails on the law and the facts. Defendant cites no authority to the effect that a defendant's 
subjective understanding of the Miranda warning is controlling, see Br. Aplt. at 10-13, 
nor is the State aware of any. Furthermore, the record contains no evidence that defendant 
misunderstood his warnings. On the contrary, defendant told the detective that he did 
understand his rights {see R. 155). 
Defendant's "fear." Without citation to the record, defendant's brief claims that 
his waiver was "motivated by . . . fear." Br. Aplt. at 12. He further asserts that Detective 
Stapley was exerting "enormous pressure on him." Id. This claim is inadequately briefed. 
17 
The claim is wholly unsupported by any citation to the record. See id Moreover, 
the only "pressure" defendant identifies is the fact that he was "arrested by four officers, 
and a K-9 unit, and he was being interrogated in a back room at the Iron County 
Correctional Facility by a Detective who was exerting enormous amount of pressure 
on him." Id. Generalized claims of "pressure," without reference to the record, do not 
satisfy the requirements of rule 24(a)(9). 
Nor is this claim supported by relevant authority. Defendant cites a single case 
in support of this claim, United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140 (2nd Cir.1980). See 
Br. Aplt. at 12. Mohabir is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the sentence defendant 
excerpts from it and relies upon does not appear in the opinion. 
Second, Mohabir is discredited. Seey e.g., Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 295 
(1988), Riddick v. Edmiston, 894 F.2d 586, 587 (3rd Cir. 1990); State v. Hamons, 805 
P.2d6, 11-12 (Kan. 1991). 
Nevertheless, it is true enough that "rejection of federal constitutional rights motivated 
by fear" may under some circumstances not "constitute an intelligent waiver." Moore 
v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 164 (1957) (sheriff planted in the mind of a 17-year-old African 
American youth the expectation of mob violence). But see Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 746 (1970) (rejecting inmate's claim that his guilty plea had been motivated 
by a fear of the death penalty). However, defendant has made no attempt to identify 
the relevant legal analysis and apply it to the facts of the case at bar. See State v. Thomas, 
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961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (rule 24(a)(9) "requires not just bald citation to authority 
but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority"). 
Moreover, to the extent that defendant is claiming his waiver was coerced, he has 
failed to cite any of the relevant authorities, such as Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 
113 S. Ct. 1745, 1754 (1993); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986); 
Galli, 967 P.2d 930; State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995); State v. Mabe, 864 
P.2d 890 (Utah 1993); State v. Ashdown, 5 Utah 2d 59, 296 P.2d 726 (Utah 1956), affirmed, 
357 U.S. 426 (1958); Nickel v. Hannigan, 97 F.3d 403, 410 (10th Cir. 1996), cert, denied, 
117 S. Ct. 1112 (1992); United States v. Guerro, 983 F.2d 1001 (10* Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Robertson, 19 F.3d 1318 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. 271 (1994), none 
of which support his claim. 
Because this point is not supported by record citations, authority, or analysis, it 
is inadequate'y briefed and not properly before this Court. See, e.g., State v. Wareham, 
772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); 
State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996); State v. Streeter, 900 P.2d 1097, 
1100 n.3 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). 
Attachment of right to counsel. To the extent that defendant claims the police 
had a duty to provide counsel to him after he waived the right to counsel, the claim fails 
on the law. Defendant argues that a defendant's right to counsel does not depend upon 
a request. Br. Aplt. at 11. This statement is correct, see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470, but 
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irrelevant. The right to counsel and the presence o/counsel are different. Defendant 
had the right to counsel, but waived it after being duly warned as required by Miranda. 
Defendant cites no case holding that non-coercive interrogation after a legal waiver of 
Miranda rights is a Sixth Amendment violation, and the State is aware of none. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT and PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Oral argument would not significantly aid the Court in deciding this case. Because 
this case raises no novel question of law, a published opinion would add nothing to the 
body of Utah law. ^ 
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